Since 2010, quinquennial UK National Security Strategies -and the Strategic Defence and Security Reviews that follow -have been based on a public National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA). The purpose of the NSRA is to identify and prioritize UK security risks for the coming five-yearly cycle based on their likelihood and impact. This article recognizes that trading off severity against likelihood is a valuable strategic heuristic. Yet it concludes that until the NSRA can address nine key limitations, it will remain a flawed exercise. Such findings carry implications for UK policy, and for other states operating NSRA-style risk matrices.
The promise and pitfalls of the incorporation of such risk-assessment methodologies into intelligence and security policy -particularly the eclipsing of traditional conceptions of 'threat' (politically relational) by the linguistically depoliticized notion of 'risk' -have already been the subject of extensive critical analysis by both scholars and legislators. 6 The purpose of this article is more bounded, therefore. It examines the logic, process, evidence base and findings of the UK NSRA as currently constituted to derive nine lessons that expose the limitations of such a risk-based approach to national security strategizing. In the spirit of a 'critical friend' , the article recognizes that the NSRA's fundamental tradeoff -security threats' likelihood against their severity 7 -represents the expected 'value equation that ought to lie at the heart of grand strategy' . 8 Threat and risk are not mere synonyms, and the latter's compound severity/likelihood calculation makes it strategically valuable. 9 As such, it is better that some attempt at strategic prioritization, of which the NSRA is Britain's current official effort, exists than if it did not. There is also demonstrable value in 'horizon-scanning' and 'futures' analysis, variants of which inform the NSRA, as long as awareness of such techniques' fundamental limitations is maintained. 10 Nonetheless, in choosing one methodology over others, and particularly imbuing that political choice with the allure of seemingly apolitical quasi-science, certain path-dependent limitations are imposed on efforts to exercise prudent strategic judgement, as the article will demonstrate. 11 Such a finding has resonance far beyond the UK. In a time of multi-sourced dangers and tight security budgets, the allure of such apparently 'scientific' grounds for policy trade-offs is being felt throughout the Western world. 12 The US Department of Homeland Security has made a similar Strategic National Risk Assessment public since 2011. 13 France's 2013 Defence White Paper listed risk assessment among its stated means of ensuring national security.
14 Germany's Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance conducts a range of different national risk assessments. 15 Australia issues central-government direction to federal states on the conduct of their own emergency risk assessments. 16 Canada does likewise, 17 and has even attempted to introduce elements of automation into such assessments' conduct. 18 Beyond nation-states, risk matrices and the associated lexicon have also made their way into the security policy of key international organizations. 19 Further examples abound. Nonetheless, among all such users, only Britain has elevated such risk assessment to become the top-level underpinning of national security strategy. The UK NSRA therefore serves as a valuable test-case for those interested in the possible applicability of such methodologies to other states' strategic contexts. note: each nSra is focused on the next five years, but has a twenty-year outlook.
Cross-national generalizability of the findings notwithstanding, moreover, UK foreign/defence policy matters for Euro-Atlantic security in its own right. Britain remains the second-most-capable military/intelligence power in NATO on most metrics, and the second-most-capable in the world on some. With an unreliable and dysfunctional administration now installed in Washington, and certain other major NATO powers lacking the will to provide meaningful capability, 20 anyone who cares about the West's ability to protect itself should care about the determinants of UK national security strategy. Figure 2 . the evolution of the uK nSra risk tiers, from inception to the present. Sources: nSS 2010, 27; nSS/SdSr 2015, 87. note: 2010 wording is paraphrased for concision; 2015 wording is directly quoted. 2015 'current tiers' is at time of going to press (March 2018).
The limitations of the NSRA matter, for it is not some trivial adjunct to national security policy-making. On the contrary, since 2010, it has been the top-level underpinning of all subsequent security policy prioritization, including the budgetary/procurement decisions that will equip Britain to face a dangerous future. This, in turn, carries implications for the intelligence services (and respective political/ financial weighting between them), the armed forces (ditto), the diplomatic service and all other levers of UK state power. None of this is to suggest that the NSRA exists in a bubble or is the sole determinant of British national security policy: long-standing pillars of UK threat-assessment and crisis-response machinery -such as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and COBRA 21 organization -have been joined since 2010 by a Cabinet-level NSC capable of directing a toplevel government response to specific emerging security contingencies. 22 The NSRA is therefore only intended to provide general, broad-brush guidance. Nonetheless, that general guidance is important, shaping and framing the NSS/SDSRs that subsequently determine the long-term priorities of all elements of the British national security state. As such, its strengths and weaknesses merit understanding.
In an age characterized by major politically driven changes in the UK security environment, moreoverincluding a capricious US administration that has questioned its commitment to European defence, a belligerent major power in Europe in the shape of Russia, and Britain's own self-instigated withdrawal from the EU (along with Brexit's possible second-order consequences, such as EU military federalization and/or UK dissolution) -the NSRA's depoliticized focus on 'risk' is even more problematic. Tellingly, Brexit, UK disunion, Russian revanchism and wavering US defence commitment to Europe were all conceivable at various points in the NSRA process, even if not generally considered likely. Moscow's determination to counter NATO via force was already clear by the time of the 2010 NSRA, while the secessionist Scottish National Party (SNP) already controlled the Holyrood government. And Britons had already been promised a referendum on the little-loved EU by the time of the 2015 NSRA, while many Americans' loathing of Washington's globalist status quo was similarly evident. Yet consideration of such fundamental political change is conspicuous by its absence in successive risk assessments focused on terrorism, flooding and pandemics. Most recently, 2017-18's National Security Capabilities Review (NSCR) -an 'SDSR-lite' mini-review of overstretched UK security spending priorities -has been necessitated by the 2015 NSRA's failure to contemplate fundamental strategic upheaval. 23 Yet that same NSCR continues to use the existing NSRA methodology, compounding its limitations.
Given that the NSRA now exerts significant influence over UK national security policy, yet has also proven incapable of incorporating the major strategic shocks of its time, it is in sore need of refinement. Specifically, the article concludes that until the NSRA can address (1) its reliance on inherently unknowable quantitative data, (2) the qualitative differences within its risk categories, (3) the endogeneity of current threat levels to past policy choices, (4) the different causal pathways (with different policy implications) that can bring about the 'same' risk outcome, (5) the intrinsic linkages between its risk categories that render them intellectually prohibitive silos when taken individually, (6) the political subjectivity of the UK interests being advanced, (7) the cognitive biases and groupthink that determine the very contingencies that even get considered, (8) the international political effects generated by its public dissemination and (9) the political incentives to widen categories such that policy-makers cannot subsequently be proven wrong, it will remain a flawed exercise. The mere fact that there is more detailed classified analysis underpinning the publicly released NSRA does not in itself address these limitations, moreover, since they derive from the fundamental design of the process itself. 24 The nine lessons identified here -framed at the outset of each as a question in need of solution -therefore seek to restore consideration of international politics to the NSRA methodology, thereby helping it to fulfil its professed purpose. That should, in turn, improve the coherence, insight and adaptability of UK national strategy, with commensurate security benefits for both Britons and Britain's many allies.
There is another potentially troubling dimension here, too. The seemingly apolitical quasi-science of the NSRA, institutionalized as a mere internal bureaucratic procedure, risks obscuring the fundamentally political nature of contestation over what societies construe as dangers:
25 contestation that is essential to healthy democracy. It may distance citizens, asking not what costs the polity is willing to bear in pursuit of certain (conflicting) interests, but instead rendering them mere passive consumers to be told what their paternalistic superiors -supported by a faceless bureaucratic machine -have already decided. This ties into wider concerns over the 'normalization' of supposedly 'exceptional' state power in the face of a collapsed distinction between 'peace-time' and 'war-time' , with Western countries instead inhabiting a condition of continual 'national security operations' -public understanding of which is limited -with potentially negative consequences for civic life.
26 Such concerns should not be overblown: UK national security bureaucrats of the kind conducting the NSRA are, for the most part, dedicated public servants who have foregone more lucrative private-sector careers in order to play a part in keeping Britons and their democracy safe and free. The post-2010 NSS/SDSR system -of which the NSRA is a key part -is also, in many ways, the most open and systematic national security policy-making process that Britain has ever had:
27 certainly more so than taking momentous decisions in the privacy of Tony Blair's sofa, as prevailed a decade earlier.
28 Nonetheless, the disengagement of citizens and associated erosion of the quality of democracy is a real risk (no joke intended) with these sorts of regularized, internalized risk assessment processes, especially when they turn fundamental political choices over national priorities into mere fait accompli bureaucratic outputs. So in considering the UK NSRA's extant flaws and prospects for improvement, government must also ensure that the whole process of British threat identification and prioritization becomes more -or at least no less -democratic. The stakes for liberty and community are too high to permit further bureaucratic internalization and associated civic marginalization.
Nothing presented in this analysis is intended to impugn the expertise, professionalism, or morality of the officials charged with conducting the NSRA or the underlying intelligence/policy analysis. 29 The problems lie, rather, with the politically mandated parameters that they are charged with working inside, and those are the target of the article's critique. Note too that since no forecasting methodology is ever likely to become wholly reliable, given the contingency of political events, another key conclusion is that the NSRA will only ever be refined so far. 30 That in turn carries implications for prudent national strategy, including the requirement to retain both the intellectual capacity and balanced suite of highend intelligence/military capabilities to spot unforeseen threats as soon as possible, and then to respond and survive in the face of them.
Lesson 1: the challenge of good-enough quantitative inputs
As noted above, trading-off some sense of likelihood against severity among a state's many security concerns should be a key element of strategic judgement. But as soon as such trade-off moves from heuristic principle to deterministic metric, both severity and likelihood must have (implicitly numerical) values assigned to them. How, then, do we assign good-enough quantitative values to variables for which we will inevitably lack high-quality data? Even accepting the premise that the severity and likelihood of any given risk could represent pre-existing objective 'facts' , conceivably discoverable through science, achieving accurate numbers would still be vanishingly unlikely. And more fundamentally, it is not clear that such severity/likelihood is even knowable in advance, given that these values will reflect complex contingencies that combine unique circumstances with human agency (specifically, agency intended to circumvent those very policies put in place to prevent such contingencies' occurrence).
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Future outcomes are thus neither predetermined, nor reliably predictable, nor independent of our present choices. 32 As Mark Phythian observes, furthermore, ' … risk is by definition situated in the future. It is always present yet never arrives' (because once a risk manifests itself, it ceases to be a potential contingency with some hypothesized combination of severity and likelihood -i.e., a risk -and becomes an actual attack/catastrophe/disaster/etc with an observable cost).
33 Accordingly, national security risk must be recognized as a domain of intrinsic uncertainty, rather than something that -with enough data-mining -will eventually become dependably quantifiable.
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As a variation of this point, by attempting to compare categories of risk through expert judgement of their severity/likelihood, how do we arrive at meaningfully comparable variables? Comparing flooding with nuclear war is not comparing apples with oranges; it is comparing apples with elephants. Thus, a flooding expert may contend that serious flooding is high-severity. A nuclear expert, meanwhile, may similarly contend that a strategic nuclear exchange between major powers would also be high-severity.
These two understandings of 'severity' cannot draw upon shared, objective criteria; the fluvial scientist and nuclear strategist are drawing on different lexicons and cognitive frames. The inaugural NSRA's contention that it represents the 'plausible worst case' 35 judgement of 'subject-matter experts, analysts and intelligence specialists' 36 is therefore not a panacea for effective strategy; simply surveying numerous policy-connected subject-matter specialists does not in itself deliver sound data or reliable prioritization. 37 It may be possible for us to produce an ordinal ranking of the two -almost everyone is likely to agree that thermonuclear war would be worse than the severest flooding. But even this is not straightforward. If we are to derive policy prescriptions from this assessment, we need to know how much worse nuclear war is than flooding -is it a hundred times as bad, or merely ten, or a thousand? And even if we could 'objectively know' that it was a hundred times as bad, would prudent policy prioritization then be readily delivered by simply spending a hundred times as much on nuclear countermeasures as on flood defences, or does likelihood re-enter the equation (and how do we then get a reliable quantitative value for that, too)? What about truly catastrophic hypothetical flooding that could (conceivably) be as high-impact as nuclear attack -a sudden ten-metre rise in the Thames that drowned London, say -the likelihood of which is miniscule compared to 'normal' flooding, but which takes it into 'comparably severe' territory?
The NSRA depicts even the most catastrophic of potential contingencies, such as a major-power strategic nuclear exchange, on a matrix that -due to the strictures of A4 publishing -depicts severity and likelihood in approximately equal proportions (see also the representation in Figure 1 ).
38 And yet, for truly existential security threats of a kind that includes great-power nuclear warfare but surely does not include flooding, the value that might prudently be assigned to 'severity' dwarfs even highly probable yet less-severe risks' likelihood. That is, the heuristic trade-off between impact and probability fails if strategy becomes incapable of appreciating the full gravity of certain threats through the pursuit of a neat 1:1 cost/possibility trade-off. This is manifested most starkly in the NSRA context through the tensions within the 'Tier Two Risks' category: risks that are, in the government's view, either probable-but-modest or severe-but-unlikely. In the 2015 NSS/SDSR, for instance, 'CBRN Attack' -direct attack on Britain using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons -appears only in Tier Two, despite avoiding escalation to such weaponry having been the highest aim of strategy since the dawn of the 'nuclear revolution' in 1945. 39 The same tier also includes 'Financial Crisis' , a near-certainty at some point in the business cycle, yet one that -besides undoubted impact on living standards -may kill no-one. 40 In the NSRA's quasi-scientific fiction, one risk's near-certainty (financial crisis) and another risk's high costs (nuclear war) equate as comparable -and yet, no common-sense reading would treat the avoidance of nuclear war and the avoidance of financial crisis as co-equal goals of security policy, given the former's potential to terminate human life on the British Isles (and possibly Planet Earth). The inability to assign good-enough values to variables that the methodology relies on -and, in particular, the inability to account for the potentially infinite costs of some contingencies versus the high probability of others -thus drives the severity/ likelihood trade-off from useful strategic heuristic into prudence-obscuring dogma.
Lesson 2: the challenge of qualitative variation within categories
The previous point leads straight into the next. Grouping certain risks into categories -'Terrorism' , 'Public Health' , 'Instability Overseas' and so on -begs the question, how do we incorporate such significant variation in likelihood/severity within categories without rendering the categorization unhelpful? Again, the problem can be distilled as an inability to assign meaningful values to variables that the methodology relies on doing just that for, such that we do not simply produce an ordinal ranking of which threat is worse, but rather how much worse a risk is given its (possibly unknowable) severity/likelihood. Take 'Terrorism' (for example), a Tier One risk in the 2015 NSRA. 41 There is a world of qualitative difference between attacks on the scale of the 2013 Lee Rigby killing, on the one hand, and some future 9/11-eclipsing nuclear terrorist attack, on the other. The former was shocking, tragic, likely to be repeated, but ultimately a statistically trivial addition to the UK murder rate. The latter, by contrast, would be catastrophically high impact -a city-destroying level of magnitude more significant than Rigby's murder -yet fortunately would also be very difficult to conduct. In between these two extremeseasy-to-conduct knife murder and difficult-to-conduct nuclear bombing -lie other attacks that are severe enough to engender polity-wide fear yet that do not threaten the existence of a community or conurbation (say), e.g., future 7/7-level attacks. The same goes for 'Cyber' , another 2015 NSRA Tier One: future denial-of-service attacks on government webpages (say) are highly probable but unlikely to kill anybody, while a cyber-induced meltdown at a nuclear power station is much harder to conduct yet could conceivably reach mass-casualty severity levels. Likewise for 'CBRN' (Tier Two), in which the difference between a terrorist 'dirty bomb' that disseminates a modest amount of radiological material versus a state-backed thermonuclear strike is so vast as to render the category meaningless. 'Public Health' (Tier One) could similarly mean a society-decimating super-virus, or merely the diabetes-fuelling growth of increasingly indolent waistlines -a fundamental challenge to Western welfare budgets, certainly, but not necessarily a threat of swift communal extinction. And so on for most of the 2015 NSRA's twenty risk categories.
Lesson 3: the challenge of risks' endogeneity to prior policy
The previous two points similarly feed into another: the endogeneity of current risk levels to prior strategic choices and behaviours. The severity and likelihood of any given category of threats to Britain is not some exogenous 'fact' ordained by Heaven; they are shaped, rather, by the efficacy of past UK policy responses to such threats. This, in turn, carries the potential to distort future policy. For if a risk features low down in the NSRA's prioritization, that may lead policy-makers to conclude that it merits little attention or associated expenditure. Yet if the very reason why the issue features low down in the NSRA's rank-ordering is precisely because it has received substantial prior resources and policy commitment, does that produce a self-defeating circularity to the NSRA's Risk Tiers, whereby the most successful aspects of UK foreign/defence policy are also used as grounds for their discontinuation?
Illustrating this point, the 2015 NSRA concludes that 'Military Attack on the UK, Overseas Territories or Bases' is only a Tier Three risk: the lowest category.
42 Yet this is not for want of foreign powers with both reason and capability to harm Britain. Rather, previous and current elements of UK policy -its nuclear deterrent, its deployable conventional forces (particularly via forward presence in places like the Falkland Islands), its deeply embedded alliance with the international system's pre-eminent superpower and so forth -are the very reason why this risk is currently low (albeit arguably not as low as the NSRA supposes). Britain has thus caused a favourable change in its security environment. Yet following the professed rationale of the NSRA as the underpinning of the NSS/SDSR, the Tier Three ranking of 'Military Attack' should see little in the way of diplomatic attention or defence spending assigned to its avoidance. To afford it such limited attention and resource would be to make the resumption of a more serious risk of military attack more likely, however, thereby giving Britain another more imminent threat to contend with. Tellingly, 1981's assessment that there was little threat to UK interests outside the North-east Atlantic itself shifted the calculus of Argentine policy-makers. 43 Sound strategic judgement is therefore necessary here, to recognize that successful deterrence is hostage to selection bias -the relative infrequency of serious UK deterrence failures is not evidence that the policy and associated procurement that brought about such a favourable situation has become redundant.
More generally, there is an obvious difference between responsive and preventive policy. The NSRA is based on assessment of the severity/probability of outcomes, i.e., attacks and disasters thatby occurring -will have necessarily not been prevented. How, then, can future NSRAs incorporate prevention -including via various 'invisible' mechanisms, prone to hidden-variable bias, such as deterrence 44 -rather than merely stipulating ways to respond to calamity, given that prevention modifies the very probability/likelihood figures that the risk assessment is seeking to weigh, rendering the whole calculation circular?
Lesson 4: the challenge of alternative causal pathways with similar outcomes
Following from this point on outcomes versus prevention, another challenge for the NSRA to overcome is that very different causal pathways can lead to the same observable 'risk outcome' . How, then, can the NSRA incorporate the different strings of events, intentions, interactions, uncertainties, information asymmetries and so forth that might yield the 'same' risk?
This is important for two reasons. First, even if the observed effect is the same, different causal pathways can necessitate very different policy solutions -and insofar as the NSRA's utility derives from its guidance for policy prioritization, it will remain indeterminate until it can steer decision-makers towards appropriate policy responses. For example, 'Radioactive or Chemical Release' (Tier Three) from a civilian UK facility (say) could come about as a consequence of terrorist action, or state-sponsored cyber-attack, or simple operator/system failure, to name but three possibilities. The net result -radioactive/chemical release over UK population centres, delivering a certain level of biological/economic damage -may be the same. But the appropriate policy prescriptions to be derived are completely different between the three causal logics. The former might necessitate extensive spending on domestic counter-terrorism, possibly accompanied by overseas military action. The next might necessitate extensive spending on cyber-resilience and Britain's own defensive/offensive cyber options, possibly accompanied by a 'cross-domain' deterrent posture that threatens retaliation using Britain's non-cyber capabilities if the radioactive leak (say) is severe enough. The latter might necessitate simply giving national security resources to civilian chemical/nuclear safety authorities and training programmes. As another more basic example, 'Terrorism' (Tier One) could be caused by implacable hostility to Western values or blowback against UK foreign policy. The net result, a desire to attack Britain, might be the same -but the policy prescriptions that follow might be diametrically opposed (extensive military operations to destroy those who hate us, if the former, versus conciliatory 'light-touch' foreign policy, if the latter). As a final example, 'CBRN Attack' (Tier Two) might result from a foreign state choosing to use its CBRN weapons against Britain or as a result of a foreign state losing control of its CBRN capabilities -or some murky combination of both (say, if semi-rogue Pakistani military/intelligence officers saw strategic/ideological/ financial value in passing a nuclear weapon to Islamists). Again, the net result -CBRN weapons directed at Britain -might be the same. But the associated policy prescriptions -overwhelming retaliation against the supplier-state versus security assistance for the supplier-state -might be completely different.
Second, not only can completely different policy solutions be necessitated by different causal pathways to the same outcome, but different political meaning -and thus strategic effect -can also be drawn from the 'same' outcome, depending on the underlying causation. Returning to the 'Radioactive or Chemical Release' example of the previous paragraph, a radioactive release caused by operator/ system error would likely result in public uproar and associated political culpability -but it would not be interpreted as an act of war, or related grounds for domestic/overseas offensive countermeasures. By contrast, if the same scale of leak was caused by terrorists and/or state-sponsored proxies, it would have a very different political effect on the polity and drive demands for very different sorts of policy responses, even if the total level of biological/economic damage was no different to the operator-error scenario.
Lesson 5: the challenge of interaction between risk categories
In another similar vein, the risk categories can struggle to capture the linkages between themselves, instead functioning as intellectually prohibitive silos that create a false impression of domain autonomy. How, then, can such a rank-ordered categorization methodology adequately encapsulate the interaction-effects between categories?
Illustrating this tension, 'International Military Conflict' -a Tier One risk -is a catch-all of different political contingencies, potential enmities and military operations/tactics. Cyberattack is now likely to be an integral part of that, and indeed, may be a dangerous source of escalation incentives (if cyber capabilities incentivize first-use, are responded to via non-cyber conventional capabilities and so forth).
Yet 'Cyber' is also a separate Tier One risk category, according to the NSRA. 'CBRN Attack' is the same, yet different: the most plausible scenario for escalation to this level is via 'International Military Conflict' (Tier One), yet despite being the most catastrophic end-point of such escalation, CBRN is coded as merely Tier Two. Likewise, 'Terrorism' (Tier One) could be a form of 'Hostile Foreign Action' (Tier Two). 'Attacks and Pressure on Allies' (Tier Two) could well be the key instigator of 'International Military Conflict' (Tier One). A 'Public Health' calamity (Tier One) could follow from any combination of other situations, across all three tiers. The point is that the likelihood/severity trade-off is not some 'free-standing' , category-specific calculation. Rather, these variables are themselves conditioned by the contingent interaction effects between the categories. Deriving meaningful understanding of plausible threat scenarios requires assessment of the possible political circumstances in which these various sets of circumstances, capabilities, policies and tactics may come together. The categories do serve a purpose, but can also become cognitive prisons for strategic thought.
As an extension of this point, the categories are incomparable units; again, they are more apples-and-elephants than apples-and-oranges. 'Cyber' is itself devoid of political content; it is a mere tactical-operational vector for our own and others' strategic goals. 'International Military Conflict' is a temporal condition of relations between political actors. 'Public Disorder' (Tier Three) is a state of domestic politics likely to be triggered by various kinds of domestic policy failure/dispute. Some are highly specific, e.g., disruption to satellites (2010's Tier Two), while others are hopelessly vague, e.g., 'Instability Overseas' (2015's Tier One). And so on. The point is, the categories -which are not actually like units -can only deliver strategic insights through assessment of the interaction effects between them, yet such assessment can just as easily be complicated as facilitated by their plotting into a stratified matrix.
Lesson 6: the challenge of defining 'impact' against politically subjective interests
Alongside the preceding questions over how to know likelihood/impact, there are also questions over what understanding of 'impact' on 'the national interest' to actually prize -another implicit political assumption, yet one potentially obscured by the seeming quasi-science of a pseudo-quantitative risk matrix. The 2010 NSRA simply stated that 'Impact was assessed based on the potential direct harm a risk would cause to the UK's people, territories, economy, key institutions and infrastructure' , 46 illustrating the conflation of different kinds of impact and unwillingness/inability to assign the necessary relative weightings between them. How, then, should the NSRA make the necessary moral and political judgements over what elements of a risk's possible effects to value? What are UK 'national interests' , and what counts as 'impact' upon them?
The key fault-line can be distilled most basically as the moral question over how much value to assign to a life. What level of economic disruption or political outrage should a government accept to avoid a single citizen's death, and does the answer differ between military/security personnel and civilians? Is there a difference in the moral value of a British life versus a foreigner's life, and where do allies' citizens' lives fit? 47 'International Military Conflict' (Tier One) may consume British lives, for example, but those lives might remain largely restricted to the all-volunteer military, conducted out-of-sight/out-of-mind with little noticeable impact on civilian Britons' living standards -as was the case in the Iraq/Afghan campaigns of the 2000s 48 -although if such conflict escalates, of course, then it very much could result in death and destruction within the UK itself. 'Financial Crisis' (Tier Two) may kill no-one, but have a far-reaching effect on living standards, fiscal capacity, social cohesion and so forth. 'Terrorism' (Tier One) may not deliver many deaths or much economic disruption, but it may generate disproportionate fear and associated harm to inter-communal relations, thereby damaging the polity itself. 'CBRN Attack' could kill all of us, leaving concerns over economic disruption and social cohesion moot -conversely, in the case of a 'dirty bomb' attack on London's financial centre (say), the economic disruption could be severe but the death toll relatively low. 'Instability Overseas' (Tier One) could kill millions of foreigners while impacting an array of UK interests, but with only an indirect -or even wholly spurious -causal link to violence within the British Isles themselves. 'Resource Insecurity' (Tier Three) could result in widespread privations, but few outright deaths -or conversely, severe supply shut-offs could indeed kill many (turning a Tier Three risk into a Tier One 'Public Health' crisis, again illustrating the artificiality of the silos). 'Public Disorder' (Tier Three) makes the 'referent object' of security (the British public) both the subject and the source of the threat, thereby further complicating understandings of exactly what is being impacted. And so on.
In order to prioritize risks, therefore, as the NSRA attempts to, we need a preference ordering -derived from morally-informed political judgement -for what we actually care about. 49 If 'Financial Crisis' (Tier Two) is to rank above 'Military Attack on the UK' (Tier Three), for example -as it currently does -then the NSRA must implicitly be willing to discount Britons' lives by at least some amount vis-à-vis economic disruption to living standards. For if there was no such trade-off being made, then the relative likelihood of financial crisis versus military attack would be irrelevant to the calculation of which matters more (only the latter would matter at all, given that the former produces job losses but not body bags). More broadly, in choosing to restrict military spending (say) at a certain threshold, the government is effectively putting an economic price on the defence of its citizens' lives against foreign threats versus other areas of their welfare. Spending 100 per cent of national resources on defence would deliver a large amount of military power, but make a state an otherwise horrible place to live -so 'guns' (protection) and 'butter' (consumption) are being constantly traded off. The important thing is that this trade-off is understood, with the relationship between different possible understandings of 'impact' -death, privation, political shock and so forth -not assumed to be costless.
Underpinning all of these fault-lines are questions over the nature and sources of national interests. Ideas, norms and imagery can shape state interests, 50 an effect manifested in the UK case by valuing elevated international influence, status, role-performance and the well-being of foreigners as ends in themselves, rather than simply means to other ends. 51 This accounts in part for the coding of 'Decay and Failure of Key Institutions' (Tier Two) and 'Attacks and Pressure on Allies' (Tier Two) as independent interests, as opposed to mere vectors for other dangers. 52 And tellingly, 'Instability Overseas' is coded as Tier One because of its potential to 'creat[e] threats to the UK and our interests' -but without specifying what those interests are, or where they come from, hinting at the insight that Britain actually prizes influence overseas as an end in itself. 53 The danger of leaving such assumptions unquestioned and unacknowledged is that their potential conflicts then go unexplored: if Britain's obsession with playing an influential, interventionist role with a view to resolving 'Instability Overseas' (Tier One) is the very thing that causes UK involvement in survival-threatening 'International Military Conflict' (also Tier One), say. 54 NSS/SDSR 2015's three 'National Security Objectives' bring these unrecognised tensions into stark relief: 'protect our people' , 'project our global influence' and 'promote our prosperity' may benignly align, but there is ample scope for people-protection and influence-projection (say) to directly contradict each other in their recommended foreign policy behaviours.
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Lesson 7: the challenge of cognitively-biased groupthink
Another potential peril of any risk assessment methodology is the possibility of misguided consensuses forming, in terms of both the value assigned to each category (see above), and indeed, over which categories to model at all. The 2015 NSRA distils the universe's infinite range of possibilities down to a suspiciously convenient twenty categories, while its 2010 predecessor chose fifteen -again, an implausibly 'neat' number. 56 In making explicit and implicit political choices over which scenarios to even contemplate, the extant NSRA is thus hostage to certain embedded 'common-senses' over which potential threats even merit consideration 57 -a reflexive judgement of possibility and palatability. Policy-makers, including the group who conduct and oversee the NSRA, are also susceptible to cognitive prisms and biases over the scenarios that they are willing and able to contemplate. 58 Tellingly, the 2010 NSRA stated that 'All potential risks of sufficient scale or impact … were assessed' [emphasis added], 59 illustrating the circularity of having to make implicit severity judgements before even conducting the assessment (which is itself supposed to determine severity)! How, then, should future iterations of the NSRA avoid groupthink around which questions are even asked?
To put this in concrete terms, the UK has encountered two key shocks since the 2015 NSRA that were not even among those considered -and not because they were utterly inconceivable. First, while coding 'Decay and Failure of Key Institutions' as a Tier Two risk, the NSRA did not also contemplate the possibility that such institutions may be weakened by the UK's own choices -despite the referendum on British EU membership having already been called by the same government conducting the NSRA. The point is not that 'Brexit' is necessarily a security calamity (although it could have negative security consequences). 60 The point, rather, is that if one believes that international institutions are a key pillar of one's security, one should not also take choices that weaken those same institutions -the problem is the mutual contradiction in the policy, rather than either policy individually. Moreover, just as the 2010 NSRA failed to conceive of the threat to the United Kingdom's continued integrity created by the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, despite the separatist SNP already leading a Scottish government with just such a policy commitment by the time of the 2010 NSS, so too the 2015 NSRA similarly failed to contemplate the renewed threat to the British Union's survival that would be created by different outcomes to the Brexit vote in Scotland and England. This threat has recently manifested itself as Scottish government demands for a second such independence referendum. 61 Again, with its quasi-scientific, apolitical pretensions, the NSRA process can model flooding scenarios (say) to the nth degree, but is blindsided by a fundamental political threat to the UK's survival -despite its manifest foreseeability, given other policy choices -not least due to an unwillingness on the part of all concerned to contemplate unpalatable outcomes.
Second, and similarly, while worrying about 'Attacks and Pressure on Allies' (Tier Two), the same NSRA did not contemplate the possibility of abandonment, coercion or other capricious behaviour by Britain's most pivotal ally, despite Donald Trump having already declared his US presidential candidacy. Again, the point is not that Trump will necessarily be bad for UK security -there are signs that Washington's prevailing foreign-policy 'common-sense' has tempered his more radical inclinations, 62 and he professes great affection for Britain -although his questioning of NATO's value certainly strikes at a core UK interest. The point, rather, is that the possibility that the United States might become less willing to underwrite UK security was not even contemplated -US backing was assumed as a structural 'fact' of the international system. Other security calamities discounted by the NSRA as unworthy even of contemplation, yet that would easily meet existential-threat impact levels, could include great-power regional or systemic war, possibly coupled to abandonment by allies, possibly necessitating national mobilization up-to-and-including conscription. This scenario is possible, albeit improbable, yet it is groupthinkingly discounted as inconceivable -not least because it would be so awful. Instead, a government aware that there would be political costs to a significant national mobilization concludes (funnily enough) that the risk environment is consistent with existing policy, including the much-reified 2% of GDP defence spending target. 63 The possible ends are thus selected to suit the means, rather than the other way around, even though quite different ends may in fact be foisted on Britain by circumstances: an example of policy-based evidence-making, rather than the (preferable) opposite. Bureaucratic silos may further reinforce this effect, moreover: the chairmanship of the NSC's NSS/SDSR Sub-Committee by the Home Secretary, and primacy of the Cabinet Office's Civil Contingencies Secretariat in running the NSRA, have both likely contributed to the heavy emphasis on domestic security issues and disaster response, for example.
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Lesson 8: the challenge of public availability
A sub-variety of this question over which categories are chosen for consideration based on what policy-makers are willing to contemplate relates to the NSRA's nature as a public document. Specifically, how are leaders able to conduct effective strategic prioritization via the NSRA when considering all options may involve informing both friends and rivals of our assessment of their intentions and capabilities, plus our response options, making negative outcomes more likely in doing so? 65 To the extent that even naming a risk in the NSRA is itself a political act, the very act of contemplating a threat in such a public forum carries costs that the British government is keen to avoid. But this avoidance itself carries costs, in terms of the very real threats that go uncontemplated (and therefore unaddressed) because we fear making them more probable through their public contemplation. 66 Risk 'results' , in short, reflect the interactive outcomes of complex systems, where every action carries second-and third-order knock-on consequences for other members of the system. 67 Illustrating this point, the 2010 NSRA summary made few references to specific hostile countries, and none to potentially hostile major powers, speaking predominantly in generalities. This may have avoided offence, but it also stripped the risk assessment of strategic utility, since international military crisis (say) is not some tragic exogenous shock, but rather the consequence of political relations between countries. The surprise generated by Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine owes, to the extent that the 2010 NSS/SDSR followed from the equivalent NSRA, to this determination to avoid reference to real-world states with which we are conducting diplomatic relations as 'threats' . Indeed, Britain's failure to see downsides to pushing for Ukrainian EU/NATO membership, supporting anti-Russian domestic-political factions and providing significant military assistance to Kiev -followed by shock when such downsides manifested themselves -further belies a national security strategy that had lost sight of relational power-politics. 68 Fast-forward to the 2015 NSRA -the first such assessment following Moscow's actions -and a willingness to discuss the possibility of Russian hostility had emerged in the NSS/SDSR. 69 But there was still no mention of China as anything other than progressive commercial partner, for example, despite widespread recognition in the intelligence community and elsewhere that Beijing is one of the main conductors of hostile cyber activity (say) against the UK, and the more general recognition that great-power competition is returning to the international system. 70 To the extent that Britain is now attempting the entangling and possibly destructive contradiction of balancing with the US against China 71 (in hope of continuing American security provision) while simultaneously bandwagoning with China 72 (in pursuit of economic gains), an unwillingness to use the NSRA to actually discuss threats in the context of real-world international politics again appears at fault. 73 And beyond obvious potential competitors, the possibility of changed relations with allies (embodied now in Trump and Brexit) or of domestic constitutional chaos (embodied in Brexit's fallout for the likes of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar) have gone similarly unexamined -in part, again, because discussing such possibilities in a public document has political costs, including the chance of making the mooted outcome more likely. 74 Methodological and disseminational choices thereby have important real-world consequences.
Lesson 9: the challenge of decision-makers' political incentives
A further variation of the public availability critique -and thus another aspect of the real-world security consequences of methodological/disseminational choices -relates not just to diplomatic limitations vis-à-vis allies and rivals, but to the perverse incentives it creates for electorally-aware politicians too. Put simply, because the NSRA is a public document, leaders face political costs to being 'proven wrong' -and thereby face incentives to stretch their categories to incorporate such a wide spectrum of possible contingencies that they avoid future embarrassment. The result can be catch-all risk categories that are unfalsifiably vague, and thereby of little help with strategic prioritization, but that have the advantage of allowing political leaders to claim that they took appropriate precautionary measures when they are inevitably confronted by unforeseen attacks and disasters: one perverse consequence of the importation of the 'precautionary principle' into risk assessment since the 1990s. 75 How, then, should future NSRAs offset leaders' temptations to produce unhelpfully open-ended risk categories, as a way of covering themselves against the political costs of future calamity?
Illustrating this point, NSRA 2015 lists 'Instability Overseas' as a Tier One risk. Obviously, this category is so sweeping as to be absurd -it would be breath-taking if there were not some form of 'instability overseas' during any one NSS/SDSR period, given that that term could cover everything from state failure in Sudan to financial collapse in Greece to regional war in the Middle East to constitutional crisis in the United States, and more besides! 76 While not quite so egregious, other 2015 NSRA risk categories -'Terrorism' (Tier One), 'Cyber' (Tier One), 'Serious and Organised Crime' (Tier Two) and so forth -are almost as guilty in their politically expedient non-specificity. Events covered by those three categories were definitely going to happen during the 2015-20 NSS/SDSR period, for example (and duly have done). But they are also sufficiently vague as to cover a wide spectrum of possible outcomes and thereby provide political cover against future disasters while simultaneously delivering little by way of useful strategic prioritization. And that absence of meaningful prioritization subsequently reduces the whole exercise's budgetary utility: the ends/ways/means calculation that is at the heart of effective strategy, and that is a core part of the NSRA's professed rationale. For as long as the risk categories are sufficiently vague as to provide political cover against all possible contingencies, they also provide a resource case for all conceivable domains of national security spending.
As a corollary, moreover, these political incentives may also produce a path-dependent 'ratchet effect' that further hinders prudent rank-ordering of threats. For given the likely electoral costs of 'downgrading' a risk that then manifests itself later, the political incentive is to add new categories to the risk tiers, but without simultaneously taking 'old' categories away. Thus, between 2010 and 2015, the overall number of risks in the NSRA grew from fifteen to twenty, while Tier One grew from four to six categories (one category 'promoted' from 2010's Tier Two, 'Instability Overseas' , and one that came from parsing-out public health crises from natural hazards -see Figure 2 ). If the NSRA is 'sticky downwards' , i.e., risks are politically cheap to move up the tiers but politically costly to move down the tiers, then the associated 'risk inflation' is likely to be even more inimical to hard-headed threat prioritization over time. It could also become actively counter-productive, if the politically motivated overstatement of dangers produces unnecessary overreaction that then engenders hostile counter-reactions. 77 And if a further corollary to these incentives is using an ever-more-expansive NSRA as a pretext for ever-more-intrusive state control of individual freedom, in an effort to drive the risk of political embarrassment towards zero, then it could also do different kinds of harm to the polity that it exists to protect.
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Conclusion
Trading off severity against the likelihood of key security threats manifesting themselves has always been an important element of prudent strategic judgement. In that sense, the British government's decision to more rigorously weigh the hard choices that underpin national strategy is a positive development, particularly given the combination of untested, contradictory and ultimately disastrous assumptions that drove UK foreign and defence policy through the 2000s. Given the mixture of threats that Britain currently faces, moreover -both state and non-state -there is value in trying to prioritize those challenges most requiring of intelligence scrutiny, resources and policy attention. And given the political uncertainty afflicting Britain both domestically and internationally at present, there is value in a standing, codified list of national security priorities providing structure and direction to intelligence-gathering, military planning and associated strategic choices.
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Even with these recognitions in place, however, the NSRA as it stands creates new problems to replace those that it solves. If it is to be further refined such that it begins to deliver on its proponents' promises, it must therefore address nine key problems. First, it must resolve how to best exercise shrewd strategic judgement over impact/likelihood while conceding that it will never have meaningful input data for those values. Second, it must work out how to account for vastly differing spectrums of impact/likelihood within each given risk category. Third, it must find a way to better incorporate the endogeneity of current security threats to prior policy choices, such that those threats that have been best deterred/contained in the past do not show up as artificially trivial candidates for strategic neglect. Fourth, it must find a way to unpack the different causal pathways that can lead to the same outcome, given the different policy responses that these different pathways may necessitate. Fifth, it must do more to incorporate the inherent linkages and interactions between the risk categories -as well as recognizing their differences in kind -rather than presenting them as distinct silos. Sixth, it must be clearer about what UK interests are, where they come from and how they rank vis-à-vis one another -particularly the thorny questions of just how much risk to citizens' lives can be accepted in order to save non-British lives or to avoid economic/social disruption. Seventh, it must clarify how it will break out of the related intellectual prisons of cognitive bias and groupthink in terms of the risks that it is even willing to contemplate, lest critical threats to Britain get 'pre-selected' out of even receiving consideration. Eighth, it must contemplate the political effects of its presence as a public document, particularly the question of whether the desire to avoid offence to allies and rivals alike is driving a false depoliticization from relational 'threat' (concrete and strategically useful) to abstract 'risk' (strategically useless if it obscures relevant political dynamics). Ninth, the political incentives to avoid the appearance of error, and the associated incentive to widen risk categories into unfalsifiable catch-all baskets, must be acknowledged and countered. In addressing all of these limitations, moreover, government must find ways to preserve -and ideally expand -the involvement of wider society in security policy, lest it do further creeping harm to the democratic polity that the NSRA exists to protect.
While these findings are UK-focused, furthermore, they should not be of interest only to those concerned with British security. Rather, in its now-observable combination of incentives and distortions, the UK NSRA serves as a case study for other states that may be similarly tempted by the allure of pseudo-scientific risk matrices. The tale so far is cautionary, albeit not-yet-irretrievable.
The conclusion that identifying and prioritizing security interests is difficult does not mean that the effort should be abandoned. Several tangible improvements could be swiftly and cheaply implemented in the UK NSRA context. First, rigorous 'red-teaming' of possible threats both within and beyond government -either via a formal 'Office of Net Assessment' and/or on an ad hoc basis -would serve to challenge embedded assumptions and internalized 'common senses' more rigorously than simply pooling Whitehall's (undeniably extensive) collective expertise.
80 Such 'red-teaming' is not a magic bullet that will suddenly let policy-makers see the future, but it at least enables the bursting of strategically corrosive groupthink while facilitating deeper societal engagement. Second, the language of 'threat' could be restored to the process, thereby reinstating relational politics within UK strategic prioritization. Flooding (for example) is rightly labelled a 'risk' , but the danger of military escalation with Russia in Europe -say -cannot be given its proper place in UK security policy without explicit contemplation of threat. Third, the NSRA methodology (and associated graphical presentation, à la Figure 1 ) could feature multiple curves -potentially including exponential and/or logarithmic scaling, alongside the simple 1:1 linear projection displayed currently -to encapsulate the full universe of potential threat severity. Fourth, additional data could be gathered to buttress likelihood-versus-impact calculations; comprehensive data on past floods' and pandemics' human and economic costs could be gathered by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory's (DSTL) Historical Analysis Division, say, and plotted against comparable data for Britain's many discretionary wars (while conceding that such data will only ever show so much, as discussed). Fifth, the NSRA could even be open -as Britain's National Institute for Clinical Excellence effectively is 81 -over the monetary value assigned to saving a single British life, possibly with further explicit deflators for allied and non-allied foreigners' lives, although this would carry its own drawbacks. Beyond such low-hanging procedural fruit, however, only a combination of humility and clear direction from the top of government will begin to address the NSRA's more intractable limitations, bound as they are to the political judgements and incentives of UK strategic decision-makers and their counterparts overseas. As a final postscript, then, it goes without saying that no matter how far the NSRA is improved, we must retain great circumspection about both our ability to foresee future threats and our ability to bring order into the complexity of international politics via purposive policy. 82 This necessitates retaining the intellectual capacity to adapt quickly to changing circumstances, along with a large and flexible enough pool of material capabilities -a balanced suite of military/intelligence power, in particular 83 -to respond and survive in the face of the emerging dangers of a multipolar international system. Dudziak, War Time, 134; Neal, "Normalization and Legislative Exceptionalism, [260] [261] [262] [263] [264] [265] [266] [267] [268] [269] [270] [271] [272] [273] [274] [275] [276] Porter, "Soldiers Fighting Alone, [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . This is a situation that the US Founding Fathers cautioned against explicitly, of course: Rothkopf, "It's not About Snowden-it's About Madison. " 27. The 2015 NSS/SDSR was preceded by a public consultation, for example, while Parliamentary Select Committees are ever-more-energetic in their scrutiny and national security agencies are ever-more-engaged with external stakeholders: Blagden, "Politics, Policy, and the UK Impact Agenda. " 28. Porter, Blunder. 29. NSRA analysis is led by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), a sub-division of the National Security Secretariat (NSS) within the Cabinet Office: Tesh, "Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), Cabinet Office". The NSS is led professionally by the National Security Adviser (NSA) -a career civil servant, with all four to date (since the role's 2010 creation) having backgrounds predominantly in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The NSS answers, via the NSA, to the National Security Council: a Cabinet Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, formed of all Secretaries of State (drawn from Parliament) heading security-related government departments (with mandated attendance by the top-ranked military and intelligence officials). See: HM Government, "Intelligence and National Security: About Us". Such analysis is conducted as part of the development work ahead of the publication of an NSS/SDSR, with the option for a periodic refresh outside the quinquennial NSS/SDSR cycle if directed by the NSC. The process does have democratic accountability, therefore, although it is conducted within a relatively small group of bureaucrats answering to a sub-set of senior ministers within central government. 30. For the counter-view that 'big data' coupled to modern computing power will in fact yield decisive improvements in political forecasting, see: Kukier and Mayer-Schoenberger, "The Rise of Big Data, " 28-40. The two views are not necessarily incompatible, of course: data-plus-computing could well improve forecasting, while the fundamental limitations discussed here nonetheless remain. On what such approaches may/may not be expected to deliver, see: Horowitz and Tetlock, "Trending Upward. " 31. Jervis, System Effects, 10-21; Edmunds, "Complexity, Strategy and the National Interest, " 525-539. This is why -while there can certainly be value in explicit predictive quantification -we should never expect it to carry us too far: Horowitz and Tetlock, "Trending Upward. " 32. Voros, "A Primer on Futures Studies, " 1-7. 33. Phythian, "Policing Uncertainty, " 190. 34. Porter, "Taking Uncertainty Seriously, " 239-260. 35. NSS 2010, 37. 36. Ibid., 25. 37 . Moreover, even deep subject-matter experts in specific fields can be vulnerable to predictive failure, given the difficulties of incorporating intruding variables from domains beyond their specialism: Tetlock, Expert Political Judgement, 67. And ultimately, it is a social choice -albeit with a material base -how societies (and different groups/ individuals within them) interpret and construe dangers, rather than an 'objective' matter for expert assessment, particularly when it comes to moral-political judgements over acceptability/cost-tolerance: Douglas, Risk and Blame, [38] [39] [40] . This theme is picked up again in Lesson 6. 38. HM Government, Fact Sheet 2, 1. 39. NSS/SDSR 2015, 87. On the idea that avoiding rather than winning war became strategy's principal concern with the advent of the atomic bomb, see: Brodie (ed.), The Absolute Weapon, 76. 40. Of course, a recession-induced collapse in healthcare spending could indeed result in casualties. But then again, such healthcare reductions could themselves be avoided through increased taxation of citizens' wealth -with potential negative implications for economic dynamism, obviously -further illustrating the centrality of morallyinformed political judgement and the inevitability of costly trade-offs to all aspects of national strategy. 
